On the Phenomonology of Mass Extermination in Europe
A Comparative Perspective on the Holodo-mor
Full text file (PDF, 1.640 kB)
(Digest 2005, pp. 183222)
The· 20th century has sometimes been called the century of mass extermination.[i] It is easy to see why: In no other century in history have so many human beings been killed by other people, not just in terms of absolute numbers but also, as far as we can tell, in terms of intended and preventable killings as a proportion of all deaths in one century.[ii] A certain barbarization is inherent in what we call humanity’s civilizing process: an increase in the probability that people will die not as a result of old age, illness, natural disasters, accidents and similar events, but as a consequence of deliberate killings by other people or in circumstances that could have been prevented by others.
What kind of comparison, if any, is appropriate here? Can we compare the following events, all of them involving the killing on a huge scale of people who were unable to defend themselves, with one another? Consider the Ottoman massacre of the Armenians in 1915, which is frequently seen as the first example of mass extermination in the 20th century; the Soviet extermination of the “kulaks” and many others in the GULAG archipelago (“Kolyma”)[iii]; the systematically planned and organized way in which millions of predominantly Ukrainian peasants were left to die of hunger in 1932-33 (the “Holodomor”, i.e. extermination through hunger); the systematic extermination of the Jews, Sinti and Roma, Slavs and many others by the Germans (“Auschwitz”, “Shoah”, or “Holocaust”); the Japanese massacres of the Chinese civilian population; the waves of mass extermination actions carried out by the Chinese communists both during the civil war and in peacetime; the Anglo-American extermination of many German and Japanese civilians with nuclear and conventional weapons (“Hiroshima” and “Dresden”); recent events in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo; the extermination of hundreds of thousands, even millions, of soldiers on the battlefields of many modern wars by means of conventional weapons (“Verdun”). Finally, can all these be compared with other events that could lead to the large-scale extermination of human beings (“Chernobyl”)? Very different answers have been given to the question of what can be compared with what, and in many cases, these debates are very heated.
To compare is not to equate
The debate about whether cases of mass extermination, or any other controversial events, can be compared with one another is complicated further by a semantic problem. Saying that two things can be “compared” is often taken to mean that they can be “equated”. But the strict meaning of the word “comparable” is that some things are worth investigating in respect of a certain question, to see whether they are of the same type or different, because they appear to resemble each other or have at least one feature in common. The basis for the comparison in the present case is the large-scale extermination of human beings by other people.
Each human being and every event is unique, and none of them can be equated with any other person or event. In this respect, it is self-evident that each instance of mass extermination is, like any other complex historical event, also unique. It is an event which happens in special circumstances for specific reasons, takes a specific form and has specific causes and consequences. All of these things make it a unique historical event and serve to distinguish it from any other. People, things and events can only be equated when they are abstracted from a number of their specific characteristics and attention is focused on certain features which can, depending on the intentions and aims of the investigator, be presented as essential. The determination of these features can be made dependent on the anticipated findings, in which case the knowledge thus attained is no more than an illustration of a view that was held in advance. Alternatively, it can emerge from the application of systematic criteria, which are generally as clear and comprehensible as possible and are applied to a variety of similar objects which in turn can be taken into consideration in a meaningful way (people, things, events). A meaningful scientific comparison must be prepared to come up with unexpected and unforeseen findings, even if it starts from well-founded hypotheses which the investigator hopes or fears may be correct, and which can then be either confirmed or refuted. Unless the end result remains uncertain at the start of the comparison, this sort of undertaking is no better than an ideological project which serves to confirm prejudices. Any similar-looking object that comes under scrutiny can be treated as an opportunity to re-examine the results obtained so far.
The question of whether a specific case of mass extermination is unique, or just one of many cases of the same type, presupposes both that meaningful comparison is possible and that we can draw up a meaningful classification of types of mass extermination; on this basis, we should be able to establish whether a particular type of mass extermination has happened once or more than once in the past.
In the last 30–40 years, the genocide perpetrated by the National Socialists against the Jews of continental Europe has become a crucial comparative case and yardstick for many other cases of mass extermination. This has involved repeated attempts to emphasize the uniqueness of this case, but also attempts to demonstrate that there have been other cases of mass extermination of the same type.
In Germany, equating other cases of mass extermination with the Holocaust usually serves certain needs and interests; in countries where the relatives of victims of a mass extermination are seeking to establish a moral, political and perhaps also a financial equivalence with the Jews as recipients of an official apology and compensation payments, it serves quite different needs and interests. In Germany, what is involved is likely to be an attempt to play down the significance of the Holocaust and the need to find excuses, and also an interest in equating the Germans with other peoples who are seen as bearing no or very little responsibility for mass murders and who do not commemorate crimes committed in their name. In other countries, the purpose of treating other cases of mass murder as equivalent is more likely to be the opposite. The international recognition of the horrors and scale of the National Socialist genocide as the historical peak of modern barbarism, the intensive research that has been carried out, the German acknowledgement of various forms of guilt and the acceptance of national and state responsibility for the mass extermination; these things have set a high standard for the way in which mass extermination is dealt with as an issue in the politics of history and memory (even though this standard is still seen as inadequate). All this serves as an incentive for some to equate the mass extermination suffered by their own people with the suffering of the Jews.
In addition, the attempt to anchor a case of mass extermination in the collective memory can serve a variety of other purposes: the strengthening of a national and state consciousness of belonging to a community (collective “identity”), imposing limitations on the political room for manoeuvre available to the people responsible for the mass extermination, and numerous party-political and other particularistic needs. For these reasons, the Jewish, and often also the German, need to monopolize the word Holokaust (often in the Anglo-American spelling, Holocaust[iv]), as a way of making the claim that the National Socialists’ mass murder of the Jews was unique, has frequently been challenged, and the word has been applied to the suffering of other peoples and social groups under National Socialist, communist and other systems of rule.
During the 1980s, this seemed to happen with particular frequency in the case of the many millions of victims[v] of famine and execution in the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus,[vi] but also in the rest of Russia and Kazakhstan, during 1932-33. Since 1988, the word Holodomor has been used with increasing frequency in preference to holocaust, whenever reference is being made to the millions of deaths brought about deliberately by famine among the Ukrainian peasantry. This serves as recognition that there was a difference between these events and the National Socialist genocide and, at the same time, stresses that the Ukrainian peasants too belong to a unique category of victims. Simultaneously, however, this new usage suggests a close association between Holocaust and Holodomor to all those who are unaware of the different Greek and Ukrainian roots of the first part of each word – the Greek hólos, meaning entire or complete, and the Ukrainian holod, meaning hunger. This, once again, does suggest a comparison between the mass extermination policies of the National Socialists and communists. Even if one places special emphasis on all human beings’ equal right to life, it still makes sense to distinguish between different forms of mass murder. There are two reasons why we should do this: first, because both the effects and the causes and motives of the individual types of extermination vary greatly, and second, because very different ways of combating these types must therefore be found. Political commitment and struggles against the death penalty, wars of aggression, defensive wars, inter-state and civil wars, individual and state terror, mass extermination whether carried out by private social actors or states, death and destruction caused in war by conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction, accidents in nuclear power stations, deaths from avoidable and unavoidable natural disasters, deadly diseases and epidemics, and other causes of death – all these things require quite different approaches and involve quite different social and political opponents with different attitudes. Even if human suffering and death are often very similar for the individual victims in spite of all the different ways in which they can die or be killed, the societal-political character of death is very significant in each case. This means that scientific analysis must differentiate as precisely as it can, even if some people find this pedantic, and the appeal to general dictates of humanity and human equality may seem inappropriate – especially in view of the horror of death itself.
For most people, death – especially the process of dying and the suffering associated with it – is something terrible, regardless of whether or not these are in each individual case caused by other people’s actions or could have been avoided by such actions. At first glance, suffering that threatens life makes any differences between the causes of that suffering unimportant, or equally significant in each case. No collective can relieve individuals of the burden of their personal suffering or of what they go through as a result of others’ suffering. When one looks more closely, however, one sees that the societal context of the suffering makes a considerable difference to the suffering individual and to those indirectly affected. The cause of the suffering, in the sense of its different societal causes, is usually of decisive significance in determining whether the individual’s suffering can be endured psychologically. And this factor is even more decisive for the scale and forms of the suffering and compassion experienced by those who survive and live on after an individual’s death. There is an unresolvable contradiction between the humanitarian aspect of the equality of every human being’s suffering and death, which is of the same type, the socio-political aspect of the inequality of causes and reasons, and the consequences of the deaths of particular people in a social and political context.
Dimensions of mass extermination
The debate about the Holodomor in the USSR, and especially in the Ukraine, touches on a number of different dimensions of killing and allowing people to die – to a much greater extent than most other cases of mass extermination. This means that we need to consider the whole range of different ways of dying and killing.
There are in reality a great number of unclear, controversial and ambiguous cases and disputed borderline cases which some observers would classify as killings that can be approved of, considered praiseworthy, or at least accepted as unpreventable, but would be seen by other observers as reprehensible killings, cases of murder and criminal acts. Even so, it makes sense to distinguish between two basic types of killing and two ways of dying, which we can use to classify a large number, and perhaps even the majority, of all deaths. One could argue further that it makes sense in typological terms to add to the dichotomy of basic types a third, hybrid type under which all intermediate and questionable cases can be subsumed. This kind of triple typology makes a logical assumption that the two basic types are constructed as being in opposition to one another. Even if we were to dissolve the two basic types into a continuum of numerous intermediate or transitional types in such a way that the need to differentiate is satisfied with regard to the variations encountered in reality, this would not satisfy the need to distinguish clearly between what is found acceptable and what must be rejected.
Deadly diseases can be caused by hunger, thirst, cold, or radiation, and these in turn can be the result of forces of nature which are not foreseen by human beings. The reason for this may be that in the present state of human knowledge there is no way of predicting violent natural events, or it may be that because of existing socio-political conditions many people either choose not to protect themselves against the forces of nature, or are aware of the risks but nevertheless prepared to put their lives in danger. It may be that they are compelled by other people to expose themselves to the forces of nature. In the last two cases the danger to life is known and accepted, but there is no intention that people should be killed by the forces of nature.
Kinds and forms of human death and killing
Kinds of death
death as a result of old age or unavoidable illness
death as a result of avoidable illness
Forms of dying and killing
sudden, relatively painless death and killing
agonizing death and cruel killing
Death as a result of forces of nature
avoidable to some extent
Death brought about by technical means
unavoidable to some extent (acceptance of known risks)
avoidable (failure to observe safety regulations)
Unintended killing of human beings by other people
“tragic chain of circumstances”
manslaughter through culpable negligence
Intentional killing of human beings by other people
Individual and societally coordinated killing
killing of individuals and of individuals on a large scale
Societally coordinated mass extermination
private/societal mass extermination
mass extermination as state policy
The moral-political quality of the numbers of people killed
The moral-legal character of mass extermination
legal/legitimate mass extermination (war)
Intentions in relation to mass extermination
intention to decimate
intention to exterminate
Forms of mass extermination
forms of killing
ways of intentionally allowing people to die
Perpetrators of mass extermination
those who give and those who carry out orders
those actively and passively involved
Kinds of mass murder (democide)
political and social mass murder (politicide and sociocide)
Political functions of mass extermination
mass extermination as a political method in the exercise of power
mass extermination as the political goal of the exercise of power
People can be killed by other human beings as a result of action taken with that goal in mind (shooting, hanging, strangling, throttling, poisoning, gasing, etc.), or they can be left to certain death as victims of natural forces as a consequence of the intentional or negligent actions of another person. In the latter case it is hunger, thirst, the lack of air to breathe, radiation, or disease that kills, but the deadly force of nature is used indirectly by people against other people without any need for the perpetrators themselves to take action leading directly to death. They let the forces of nature bring about death, and usually no blood is shed.
In cases of large-scale death caused by human actions, killing becomes anonymous and at the same time collective. There is no way of attributing the death of a specific person to any other individual, as can be done in cases of shooting or similar active forms of killing. Many people share the blame and responsibility for the deaths of many other people, but no specific individuals have killed other specific individuals. This means that the force of nature that caused death, or was instrumentalised for that purpose by human beings, is hardly litigable or not litigable at all. This is because the individualized tradition of legal thought requires perpetrator and victim to have some direct or indirect relation to one another. This direct relation between specific perpetrator and specific victim only exists when an individual imprisons another individual and lets him die of hunger or thirst, lets him suffocate, or drives him to suicide.
There can be no doubt that death from starvation is one of the cruellest, most agonizing ways to die. The effects of deadly forces of nature can be assisted by the use of technical equipment, or the denial to victims of technical means that could help them escape from the deadly forces of nature – blocking roads, railways, river crossings and border crossings, or the failure to make available information about the dangers. Ideological blindness can be another contributory factor leading to unintended death as a result of negligence, even if there is no intention to kill other people directly or via the deadly effects of the forces of nature.
Throughout history, a fundamental distinction has been made between two forms of killing of human beings by other people: legitimate killings in conformity with the law, and illegitimate killings which are illegal. It is not possible here to go into the very controversial grey area between legality and legitimacy as two forms of legal thought. Some things that are legal according to the statute book are considered illegitimate by a large part of the population, and some things considered legitimate are not legal according to the letter of the law.
Among the forms of killing still considered legitimate today, in the sense of being societally acceptable in the eyes of most people and of the administration of justice in many countries, are execution (the death penalty) and killing others in battle. Blood feuds and honourable duels also continue to be considered legitimate in some societies. Even opponents of the death penalty and of all wars accept that there is a difference between, on the one hand, judges who impose death sentences, executioners who carry them out and warriors and soldiers who kill others in battle and, on the other hand, people who are generally called murderers and criminals even when legal process may have led to their being found guilty of manslaughter or causing death by negligence, rather than murder. In some cases such people are even found not guilty, for example when someone kills (“murders”) a murderer in a spontaneous reaction or kills as a delayed response to earlier unbearable suffering.
It is not only in civilian life that we frequently observe cases where someone who kills a murderer is treated with understanding. In international politics too, mass murder in response to mass murder is often regarded as a comprehensible form of revenge, even as something that can be approved of. To put it simply, there is seen to be a difference between reprehensible killing or extermination (what we usually call murder or mass murder) and forms of killing and extermination that are either honoured, or accepted because they are considered unavoidable.
In both cases, this involves killing which is intentional, deliberate, or at least seen as something that cannot be prevented. But people can also tolerate killing by other human beings or by the forces of nature, even though those involved have the power and capacity to prevent the deaths. However, it is extremely difficult to determine precisely how far someone has been guilty of failing to assist another person who is in mortal danger. If the failure to help happens within certain people’s field of vision and within an area where they could act, these people may not be perpetrators in a moral or legal sense, but they are nevertheless held to share responsibility for the actions or events that led to death.
It sometimes happens that people kill others without intending to do so, for example in traffic or workplace accidents. In such cases it is necessary to establish whether the main cause of the accident was a technical fault or human error. To the extent that technology is itself produced by human action, it is possible to argue that a technology as such, or a specific way of using it or individual operation, involves too many risks. In the debate about the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, it became clear that the different dimensions of action and failure to act had led to an unintended instance of mass extermination for which identifiable individuals could nevertheless be blamed. The concept of mass extermination, together with the subordinate concept of mass murder (as distinct from legal-legitimate mass extermination in war, especially in a defensive war or liberation struggle), calls for a clarification of what we mean by “mass”. An individual murderer tends to be spoken of as a “mass murderer” as soon as he has murdered more than two or three people. In other respects, the term “mass extermination” as part of our political vocabulary can be used in connection with dozens, hundreds, thousands, hundreds of thousands, or millions of deaths. The machine gun, which can sometimes kill hundreds of people, is not usually thought of as a weapon of mass destruction; the category is reserved for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, each of which can kill thousands of people at the very least. It probably makes sense to start speaking of political mass extermination when the number of victims reaches several dozen, and then in a secondary step to make distinctions according to the absolute and relative figures – hundreds, thousands and so on. The absolute number of Ukrainians killed was much higher than the number of Kazakhs, but as a proportion of the total population the figures for Kazakhstan were much worse than for the Ukraine. During the 20th century, mass exterminations were mainly carried out by state bodies. Some states were without doubt the most effective criminal organizations and made the most significant contributions to all the crimes of the century. But non-state organizations, especially political parties and combat organisations, also frequently participate in state campaigns of mass extermination and also conduct such campaigns on their own behalf.
The concept of mass extermination relates to both the victims and the actors responsible for carrying out the policy. In the 20th century many perpetrators worked together to kill even greater numbers of people, though there was usually a division of labour between those who gave the orders and those who carried them out. The centralization of extermination capacities in a few hands only happened during the 20th century at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where a single person was able directly to bring about the deaths of many thousands. In the case of legal-legitimate mass extermination in interstate and civil wars, one has to distinguish between the legal and moral justification of the actor(s) giving the orders and of those carrying them out. In the case of defensive war, which continues to be considered justified almost everywhere, these justifications are congruent with one another. In the case of wars of aggression, which are proscribed, they are not. Here it is only the commander who gives the order who is considered a war criminal, not the soldier who carries it out. On the other hand, the mass extermination of civilians and prisoners of war is treated as mass murder, and both those who give the orders and those who carry them out are held responsible.
The purpose of mass extermination can be either the reduction of the numbers belonging to a particular group of people (decimatory intention) or an attempt to wipe out the whole group as completely as possible (exterminism). This can be a means to another end, for example making it possible for other people to use a certain territory. As a rule, the goal of mass extermination is the exercise of power over the remaining members of the group affected by the policy. The most ruthless form of exterminism is not only designed to remove certain people from an area by forcing them to leave, driving them out, or destroying them, but also involves the active, murderous denial of the physical right of a particular group of people to exist at all. Exterminist fantasies are constantly being expressed somewhere in the world in the heat of the moment, with different peoples or other groups as their targets. However, there is a great deal of difference between enraged fantasies about wiping out whole peoples and the physical planning needed to prepare and carry out such extensive exterminist actions. For example, when Grigorii E. Zinoviev, a member of the Bolshevik Politburo and later President of the Comintern, declared that
we must have the support of 90 million out of the Soviet Russian population of 100 million people. As for the rest of them, we have nothing to say to them. They must be destroyed.[vii]
his words may have seemed to many people to be nothing more than a trivial extermination fantasy; later, though, communist practice was to go much further.
Genocide, as a particular form of mass murder, is considered especially unpardonable by world public opinion. Even so, up until now no clear and unambiguous legal and political-military tools have been developed that could prevent mass murder, provide a basis for intervention during a mass murder, or punish those responsible. One can see this clearly in the current debate about military intervention designed to protect people against serious infringements of human rights (humanitarian intervention).[viii] Immediately after the National Socialist genocide perpetrated against Jews, Sinti and Roma, millions of Slavs and others, and also after the Japanese mass murder of Chinese, i.e. predominantly mass murders of citizens of other countries, there was a particular need to proscribe genocide in a special convention, in other words to emphasize genocide and other forms of murder. It proved possible to do this in 1948, with the agreement of the Soviet Union and later of all the other communist regimes; these regimes shared the responsibility for a social mass murder but did not consider themselves guilty of genocide.
The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on 9 December 1948, defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” This concept of genocide is very broad in some respects and very narrow in others. It is broad in the sense that it means we must classify as genocide any killing of, or even infliction of harm on, two members (“members of the group” can mean a minimum of two) of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group with the intention of destroying this group in part. It is narrow in the sense that the formulations “in whole or in part”, and especially “as such”, mean that genocide is a term that can only be applied to the killing of members of another people (or of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group), not of members of one’s own people. This means that we cannot speak of genocide in cases of sociocide (the killing of members of a social group, stratum, or class of one’s own people as such) or politicide (the killing of members of a political party, organization, or movement belonging to one’s own people as such).[ix]
In other words, the Genocide Convention condemns the murder of two Ukrainians as such, but not the murder of two million peasants in the Ukraine, because killing peasants or members of a class is not genocide. Even so, killing peasants or members of a class is neither legal nor legitimate; it is a clear breach of the universal human and civil rights that are protected by other norms and conventions of international law.
In the last few decades, the different moral-political evaluations which see genocide as the mass murder of other peoples and of social and political mass murder as something where the victims may belong to one’s own people have become less sharply differentiated. This has happened to the extent that breaches of human and civil rights are no longer regarded as the internal affairs of a state. In this respect, our contemporary understanding of law considers “class murder” to be no less reprehensible than “racial murder”. The technical methods used in the killing may mean that there are differences in the extent of suffering before death, but this is not the decisive factor determining whether a certain kind of mass extermination is distinctive or something that has happened more frequently. It was not the “exceptional technical procedure involved in gasing the victims” that made “Auschwitz” distinctive, as Ernst Nolte mistakenly said in a 1986 essay which triggered off the prolonged German Historikerstreit.[x] Nor can the killing of millions of people in “uncivilized” countries like the Soviet Union, the Ottoman Empire, or Cambodia be considered any less reprehensible or more comprehensible than similar events in “civilized” countries like Germany, France, Britain, or the USA, since the same norms of human rights and of human morality, in relation to the right to life of peoples and of human beings as such, are valid – and have always been valid – in all countries and cultures.[xi]
In international law, genocide is distinguished from ethnocide; the latter term is used to mean the cultural (and so “non-violent”) destruction of a people by means of forced assimilation. “Democide” has been employed as a useful and comprehensive term which includes genocide, sociocide and politicide.[xii] This is used to refer not only to the killing of an entire people (or of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group) or of parts of it, but also to killing any population group as such – that is to say, of a group without reference to any of its personal qualities or forms of behaviour, and also without reference to its national, ethnic, racial, or religious attributes or its members’ citizenship of any state. Here, demos does not mean the people after which a state is named, the Staatsvolk, but rather – as in “demography” – the population of an area.
Some of the contributions to the special issue of Osteuropa on the Holodomor depart from the accepted use of the term “genocide” in international law.[xiii] They appear to use it to mean the killing of members of the Staatsvolk, including cases involving the killers’ own state, and to use “ethnocide” to mean killing an ethnically distinguishable part of one or more Staatsvolk. This broadening of the concept of genocide to encompass democide, that is to say “genocide perpetrated against one’s own people”, is becoming more widespread. However, it is imprecise and inappropriate. It is an expression of the recent tendency that has already been mentioned: a tendency to proscribe serious breaches of human rights as such, and to attempt in some circumstances to prevent or stop them by means of humanitarian intervention, regardless of whether the mass murder is taking place in one’s own country or abroad and of whether it is being perpetrated against one’s own or another “national, ethnic, racial, or religious group”.
From the humanitarian point of view, all human beings are equal. Seen from a socio-political and cultural perspective, the complete extermination of a numerically small people is an exterminist event which wipes out the historical existence of that small people and its culture. The extermination of the same number of human beings belonging to a larger people, on the other hand, is a decimatory event which does not threaten the existence of this people as such. In political and cultural terms, the consequences of the first case are much more serious than those of the second. The unequal political-cultural weight of two cases of mass extermination which cannot be distinguished from each other in purely numerical terms leads to an aporia; this cannot be resolved by being broken down into the human and particular elements of national, ethnic, racial and religious group consciousness.
The Holodomor: a combination of numerous forms of mass extermination
The regions worst affected by the 1932-33 Holodomor in the Soviet Union were the Ukraine and the areas of Ukrainian settlement in the North Caucasus. Like all the many mass exterminations that took place in Soviet history between 1917 and 1991, these events involved very different forms of mass extermination of human beings, happening both simultaneously and successively. The accounts in the special issue of Osteuropa show that large-scale deaths began with the persecution of functionaries of the churches and academic institutions: arrests, banishment orders and executions. It was later extended to real Ukrainian national communists and those suspected of such tendencies, which were thought to include potential national separatism and the desire to unleash nationally and socially motivated civil war. One can speak in these cases of politicide, or political mass murder. This turned into sociocide whenever someone’s social background, or even nothing more than their social extraction (i.e. the fact that their parents or grandparents had belonged to such social strata as the nobility, the property-owning bourgeoisie or educated classes, or the prosperous peasantry), was treated as a reason to suspect that they might be politically unreliable or that they might join in an anti-Soviet, nationally and socially motivated civil war. This last possibility may have been something the leadership genuinely feared, or it may just have been used as a pretext for propaganda purposes.
It seems fairly certain that tens of thousands of people died as a result of politicide, and likely that several hundred thousand perished as a result of sociocide. When the point was reached at which every Soviet citizen could, in principle, be suspected of holding bourgeois and anti-Soviet views, politicide and sociocide were no longer actions directed against specific political and social groups. In other words, the extermination terror could affect almost the entire population of a smaller or larger area, quite irrespective of their actual political views or social and national background. Later on, it was ordered that a specific quota had to be fulfilled: between 1 percent and 2 percent of the population had to be unmasked as enemies of the people. This was the most extreme point reached by a system of terror and extermination that was no longer directed against specific groups, but targeted the whole population – including the functionaries of the Soviet regime itself. In the late 1930s and the following years, the Stalinist murderers killed each other to a significant extent.
The largest number of victims of the Holodomor died as the result of famine, or as a consequence of diseases which were either caused or made worse by hunger. Hunger leading to death was not at its worst in prisons and camps, that is to say in socio-political institutions where people were forcibly interned, but rather in villages, which were not fenced off, and to a much lesser extent in towns. This meant that most victims of the Holodomor had no relation to any concrete perpetrator. Another consequence of the anonymity and collective nature of the famine was that death did not differentiate between the victims in terms of the national, ethnic, religious, or social affiliations of the villagers, or their political views. Jews, Russians, Germans and many others were always killed along with ethnic Ukrainians from the villages.
In the case of the Holodomor, the famine was definitely not a matter of food shortages as the result of an unforeseen natural disaster, and it was not even the consequence of the change of socioeconomic system and collectivization. Despite the sharp decline in food production as a result of collectivization, enough food was available. The famine was the result of a systematic and extensive withdrawal of food which hit the villages much harder than the towns. There is one controversial question, to which it is hard to give a detailed empirical answer: was the withdrawal of food largely caused for a time by overall Soviet economic policy after the world economic crisis, which led the Soviet leadership to export large quantities of grain to the West, in spite of and because of the fall in the grain price and in the knowledge that this would lead to unintended but large-scale death in the countryside? It also seems that we do not yet have a clear answer to the question of how far the leadership, which laid down the grain delivery quotas that had to be met, was or wanted to be informed about the deadly famine. It is quite possible that the system of suppression of unwanted and unpleasant news led to ignorance in the decision-making centres for which the leadership itself was to blame.
It is also unclear whether all or some of those responsible at all levels, from Moscow to those giving orders on the ground, may have believed at times in their own propaganda claims about hidden stores of food; if so, they may not actually have intended their grain requisitioning policy to kill people but would nevertheless be guilty of causing death by negligence. If this was the case, ideological blindness rather than murderous intentions would have played a significant role. However, such intentions were certainly present in many cases, especially after December 1932. After that date, conscious and active measures were taken with the intention of causing people to die of hunger: the imposition of grain deliveries at 15 times the usual level as a punishment; the requisitioning of all other foodstuffs; the closure of all shops selling food; and, at the end of all of this, the sealing off by the police and army of the famine areas in order to prevent people escaping, and the sending back to the famine areas of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian districts of the North Caucasus of peasants who had fled to the cities and to Russia. Since the famine areas could not be sealed off without the use of force, this policy meant that many people were shot.
Finally, the Holodomor period also saw small-scale actions which resembled a civil war in those areas where armed peasants defended themselves against the grain requisitioners or attempted to use force to get hold of food before they became too weak to do so. Hundreds or thousands probably died in this fashion. However, these armed actions seem to have been isolated incidents, and they were not linked organizationally by any hierarchical chain of command. Using Istvan Kende and Klaus Jürgen Gantzel’s terminology, one can therefore speak of armed clashes but not of a civil war.[xiv] Without doubt, these isolated armed encounters strengthened the determination of the Soviet leadership to take preventive measures of suppression and extermination against Ukrainian peasants who might rebel for national and social reasons, in order to prevent a real civil war.
As Rudolf A. Mark and Gerhard Simon emphasize,[xv] the original controversy in research on the Holodomor between those who interpret it as a mass murder of peasants (class murder) and those who treated it as a mass murder of Ukrainians (genocide) is probably now outdated, as these views are complementary to rather than in competition with one another. However, the synthesis between these two positions represented by an interpretation in terms of national-social mass murder still needs to be differentiated further. What makes this explanation appear most plausible is the fact that research on the Holodomor has, up until now, concentrated – for understandable reasons – on the victims. It has been primarily concerned with recording the suffering and deaths of the victims with as much precision as possible, which has meant establishing the geographical, national and social distribution of these deaths in a topography of the Holodomor.
Research on the perpetrators has largely concentrated on the ultimate responsibility for the Holodomor of those right at the top (Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov, etc.), and on the commanders of the grain requisitioning detachments and units carrying out the punishment actions and repression, whose names are recorded in local and regional documents. Up until now, though, it seems that this research has not made any systematic attempt to investigate the structure of the modes of action and consciousness of all the perpetrators involved in the organization and carrying out of the intentional, negligent, or simply accepted extermination of millions of people. There must have been many thousands, perhaps even several hundred thousand of these people. Even if the supreme command in Moscow was in the hands of non-Ukrainians, and even if a large number of reliable cadres from Russia were sent to the Ukraine to carry out the repression, the majority of the middle- and lower-ranking cadres are likely to have lived in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, which means there must have been many ethnic Ukrainians among them. These were the people who, with guns in their hands, were responsible on the spot and on the borders for the practical implementation of the Holodomor: the confiscation of food supplies, measures to seal off certain areas, forcibly transporting back to their homes those who had tried to flee the famine, and so on. They certainly had a quite different status in the extermination system than, for example, the Jews who were forced to serve the Holocaust machinery as auxiliaries in the concentration camps.
Many contributions to the debate about the social and national character of the Holodomor fail to see that one needs to distinguish clearly between the fact of an extermination and the intentions that may lie behind it. Research on the victims can only record the effects of hunger and of the forcible measures employed. It cannot say anything about the intentions of those who did not help the victims or prevented others from doing so. In order to be able to speak of murder, genocide and class murder, one must include in the analysis the intentions of the perpetrators. A disastrous accident in the Ignalina nuclear power station might kill almost all the Lithuanians and Latvians, and so would in fact lead to the extermination of two small peoples, but it would not be a case of genocide. Killing on a massive scale in a civil or interstate war can also, in extreme cases, lead to the almost complete physical extermination of a small people and the ethnic assimilation of the survivors, in other words to the total extermination of a people. Even so, this is not genocide in the strict sense of the term either.
This means that it is a methodological mistake to conclude, on the basis of the fact that the majority of victims of the Holodomor were Ukrainians, that this was a case of genocide. Whenever the perpetrators intended to kill Ukrainians as such, this was nationally and ethnically motivated murder. Whenever they intended to kill peasants as such (and in reality these were not peasants with private plots, but kolkhoz members with the mentality and views of individual peasants), this was class murder. The analytical distinction between genocide and class murder or politicide (in relation to the assumption that the peasants and Ukrainians were prepared to fight a nationally and socially motivated civil war) may well not have been very sharply present in the consciousness of many of the perpetrators, and it is quite possible that much simpler murderous intentions relating to personal survival or enrichment were decisive. Not every murderer necessarily thought of the Ukrainian peasants he was killing, or leaving to die a certain death from hunger, as Ukrainians or peasants.
One thing which can be said with certainty is that the Holodomor was not socially or ethnically exterminist, either in respect of the intentions that were stated or could be discerned in the actions of the perpetrators or in respect of the way it was carried out. To the extent that the mass extermination was intended and desired (which does not yet seem to have been established beyond doubt), it was largely a mass murder. But even if no more than several million people, and not the majority, were left to die in the famine, there can be no doubt that this was one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century. At the same time, one must stress that there is no evidence of any intention to kill all peasants or all Ukrainians, since the Soviet regime could not afford to do without peasants prepared to submit to its rule and did not want to do without Ukrainians prepared to submit. This means that the Holodomor was a decimatory mass murder and genocide, not an exterminatory mass murder and genocide like the National Socialists’ deliberate attempt to wipe out all the Jews, Sinti and Roma.
Nevertheless, the Holodomor was also in certain respects exterminatory, in the sense that there was, in its broader context, an intention not just to arrest and subjugate, but to wipe out all nationally conscious Ukrainians and even many who were suspected of becoming nationally conscious. The regime was coming increasingly to the view that the peasants who had, or were believed to have, a property-owning bourgeois mentality should not just be subjugated, intimidated and re-educated, but should simply be wiped out. To this extent, both the national-political politicide and the sociocide took on distinctly exterminist features, both in many proclamations and in practice, which were – as ever – inconsistent in a state where orders given by the centre were not actually carried out everywhere. The uneven and arbitrary way in which some places and areas suffered more from the famine, and others suffered less, can be explained in part by the inefficiencies of Soviet communist bureaucracy in the early 1930s, and was not just the result of ethnically selective differences in political planning.
There is another argument which supports the analysis in terms of a mixture of class murder and genocidal intentions, but which research on the Holodomor does not yet seem to be sufficiently aware of. In pan-Russian thought, a tradition which asserts the ethnic unity of the Russians, Ukrainians (“Little Russians”) and Belarusians and treats the linguistic differences between them as no more than differences of dialect, it was considered vital to combat the slightest stirring of Ukrainian or Belarusian national consciousness as a deviation from the pan-Russian norm. The consequence of this was a perceived need to suppress the Ukrainian dialect and replace it with standard Russian. The former was at the same time understood as a socially backward peasant dialect being replaced by an urban language, Russian in its modernized Soviet form, which was, to the Soviet Russian way of thinking, considered “proletarian and progressive”.
The consequence of this way of thinking was that Ukrainian was understood as a class or peasant dialect rather than a national language, and was seen in this way by many urban, educated ethnic Ukrainians as well as by Russians. In this respect the extermination of peasants and of Ukrainians were not only complementary steps, a combination of different things, but could also be thought of as identical if one treated the Ukrainian language as a peasant dialect. Since the Russians in the Ukraine mostly lived in the towns and cities, and the urban Ukrainians were often russified, it made sense to leave the peasant villages to the mercy of the famine rather than the proletarian cities, which were largely inhabited by Russians and russified Ukrainians and which the Soviet leaders evidently thought were less likely to rebel against Soviet rule. The question of whether this assumption was correct is irrelevant. This view of the peasant character of the Ukrainian language and culture also explains why russified Ukrainians may have thought it was ideologically desirable to participate in the policy of oppression and extermination of the “reactionary” Ukrainian peasantry, both in the Ukraine and in the RSFSR.
Unlike the GULAG system and the show trials later in the 1930s, the Holodomor did not have a very significant terror function. A policy of terror seeks to spread terror by threatening to use force in order to cause death or injury, with the goal of subjecting the survivors to the political will of those carrying out the policy. Terror is, therefore, like war, a way of continuing policy by other means, in this case deadly or other violent means. However, it is unlike war in that there is no combat between armed opponents. Terror also differs from a purely decimatory or exterminist policy which sets out to kill people and not just to intimidate them. Terror requires the living to be informed about the threat or actual use of violence, as the whole purpose of the policy is that the survivors should be alarmed and intimidated. The Holodomor, though, was – like the Holocaust – not carried out in a public way but largely kept secret and denied,[xvi] which meant that many contemporaries either knew nothing about it or could dismiss the sporadic information they received as mere rumours. A terror policy, on the other hand, seeks to make available as much information as possible and even places value on “information” which exaggerates the actual level of violence in order to spread alarm and intimidate people. This means that one cannot characterize the core of the Holodomor as the use of hunger terror.[xvii] Terror was only employed in cases where, on the local or regional level, the population was threatened with famine if it did not reveal the whereabouts of actual or suspected hidden grain supplies. The analysis which sees a connection between the timing of the Holodomor and the end of the hopes placed in the strategy of ethno-national korenizatsiya (taking root or anchoring), as a way of spreading the Soviet communist ideology among the non-Russian population, is correct. This strategy had rested on Soviet and communist politicians’ assumption that it would be possible to undermine support for “bourgeois” (including peasant) nationalism and national separatism by implementing three policies: (1) giving the larger nations their own federal or autonomous republic, or some other kind of autonomous national-territorial unit (oblast’, okrug, raion); (2) promoting ethnonational cadres up the career ladder in the non-Russian territorial units; and (3) cultivating their language and culture, though it was only the “progressive” national culture that was supposed to be cultivated, while the “reactionary” elements of national culture (above all the peasant and religious elements) were suppressed from the start.
After it had become clear at the end of the 1920s that the strategy of internationalism had failed (this involved the promotion of national cultural and administrative difference, at the same time as integration within the state as a whole and political centralization), there was a transition period in which korenizatsiya was supposed to be radically denationalized and bolshevized. After this, the Soviet and communist leadership changed course abruptly. Any insistence on the non-Russians’ ethnic, national-territorial, linguistic and cultural difference was now suspected of being nationalist. The criticism of “(Great) Russian chauvinism”, i.e. Russian nationalism, was quietly dropped. (In this context “Great” did not mean imperial, in the sense of territorially expansionist, but was a way of distinguishing between Russia and “Little” Russia, i.e. the Ukraine.) Previously, the Bolsheviks had seen Russian nationalism as the greatest threat to associative, cooperative internationalism, but now the danger was seen to lie in the nationalism of the non-Russians. At the same time, “proletarian internationalism” was filled with a new content and became part of a campaign of russification and glorification of Russian culture and history – including imperial-colonial history, which had previously come in for particularly harsh criticism from the Bolsheviks.
Having differentiated the forms of extermination, we can identify a number of questions to be examined in future research. The topography of the famine and of the ways in which people were actively murdered and exterminated should attempt to record the social and ethnic makeup of the victims and the perpetrators, and as far as possible their political-national composition. We need more information about the different ways in which Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Germans, Greeks and other natsional’nosti were affected and involved, and also about the roles of Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Another question on which little work seems to have been done so far is that of whether there was any element of social-structural selection in the deaths – not just in respect of gender and age differences,[xviii] but also in social and ethnic terms, because as whole collectives were left to die in the famine they may in some circumstances have been forced to carry out social and ethnic selection among themselves.
There has already been empirical research on the differences in the treatment of the Ukraine as a republic and the Ukrainians (and other non-Russian nationalities) and the Russians, and also in the treatment of areas of Russia inhabited by majorities of Ukrainians or Russians. However, this has not looked in detail at the predominance of territorial-national (including Russians) or ethno-national (excluding Russians) thinking, in the minds of both the victims and the perpetrators. We need detailed, differentiated analyses of this kind in order to be able to answer the question of the relevance of ethno-national intentions to kill, and of intentions to kill in order to prevent territorial separation. The differences between the treatment of the Ukraine as a republic, and the areas of the North Caucasus (i.e. part of Russia) inhabited by a majority of Ukrainians, suggests that the distinction between ethn-onational and territorial-national intentions to kill is relevant. And this in turn implies that the perpetrators did not hesitate to include Russians and russified Ukrainians in the planned famine.
A comparison between the Holodomor and the Holocaust
Both the Holodomor, the extermination of many millions of Soviet and especially Ukrainian peasants in 1932-33 (which was intended and organized by political actors and the state), and the Holocaust, the extermination of approximately the same number of Jews, Sinti and Roma in 1941-44 (which was equally an act of state policy), were clearly cases of mass murder rather than legal mass extermination. In the case of the Holocaust there was not only a racist (in practice an ethno-religious) and exterminist programme of murder, but also an extremely efficiently calculated, bureaucratically organized extermination practice which meant that every Jew who could be found, and in principle every “Gypsy”, would be killed. National Socialists also denied, both theoretically and in practice, the right to exist of some other social groups: people with severe mental and physical disabilities, homosexuals, those found guilty of serious crimes, deserters and radical pacifists. The result was that only a few members of these groups were able to survive National Socialist rule without being discovered. There have been many occasions in history when an exterminist policy has been implemented against defeated cities and small peoples, so that these have been completely destroyed and wiped out, but the exterminist genocide of millions of people (“Holocaust”, or “Auschwitz” as pars pro toto) remains, so far, a unique event in modern history.
Between 1917 and 1956, and also after that date, many more people were murdered by Soviet communists than were killed by the German National Socialists. This does not include those killed in interstate or civil wars, since what concerns us here is mass murder and not general mass extermination, which would also include deaths caused by wars and technical-industrial negligence (“Chernobyl” and other industrial accidents). In this respect, the scale of the Soviet communist mass murder (“GULAG system”, or “Kolyma” as pars pro toto) is unique in modern history, and can only be roughly equated with that of the Chinese communist mass murders.[xix]
The Holodomor, which can be approximately equated with the Holocaust as far as the number of victims is concerned, was only one part of the Soviet mass murder complex. It had specific features which have already been explained in detail. Overall, we find here a highly complex picture of different forms of extermination, which were used to kill 4-10 million people during 1932-33 in the Soviet Union, and especially in the Ukraine: the negligent causing and toleration of famine; deliberate killing by leaving people to die of hunger; unlawful murders and executions; without doubt many suicides; civil war-type armed clashes; politicidal, sociocidal and genocidal intentions to murder as a consequence of difficulties caused by Soviet and global economic problems, and above all as the consequence of a radical and fundamental ideological shift in the Soviet communist party’s nationalities policy. There has been nothing similar in modern history. In this respect, the Holodomor too is a unique event in modern history, and cannot – in terms of its scale and its socio-political characteristics – be equated with other mass murders. The debate about the uniqueness or singularity of the Holocaust (or other mass murders and mass exterminations) is burdened with the fact that in speaking of a unique mass murder, we usually assume that there are numerous ordinary, normal mass murders and genocides which do not need any particular consideration, are not part of humanity’s general consciousness, and above all should have no particular consequences in the way the Holocaust does. It has these consequences not only for the consciousness of the Jews and for Israeli politics, without forgetting the consciousness of the Sinti and Roma, but also and above all for the consciousness of the Germans and for German policy after 1945. Of course, the politics of memory cannot ensure that there is a place in humanity’s general consciousness for dozens, hundreds and thousands of mass murders and genocides, and each people will continue as a rule to have a clearer memory of its own suffering and outstanding achievements than of its own crimes.
In the Soviet case, there is no successor state that would be prepared to accept responsibility for the crimes of the Soviet communists, since they came from all the republics and peoples of the Soviet Union and Soviet communist policies cannot be seen as Russian policies in the same way as National Socialist policies were German. Nor is there, in most cases of modern mass murder and genocide, any inclination on the part of the people from which the mass murderers came to implement a policy of financial and economic reparation. In this respect it is not only the Holocaust that is unique; it is very unlikely that the German policy of memory and reappraisal of the past will or can be imitated.
There is, however, no good reason why the collective consciousness of humanity or of international society could, or should, only have room for memories of one single, unique mass murder. A number of crimes, each of which is unique in its own specific way, have their place in humanity’s memory as important warnings of the dangers of present and future policies. It would be quite possible for a humane, global politics of memory to commit itself to remembering a number of events as part of common human memory: the Ottoman massacres of the Armenians, the National Socialist genocide of the Jews, some of the numerous communist class murders and genocides (including the Holodomor), the mass murder of the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and the whole of East Africa (as a reminder of the failure of the United Nations in our time), and some other mass murders. These could be remembered at the same time as we remember the genocides and mass murders that are each part of the memory of one particular nation or large region.
There is also no good reason why there should be a competition for the title of cruellest and most barbaric mass murder in world history, in which one would evaluate the quantitative elements together with all manner of qualities – ways of going about the killing, the motives involved and the consequences, and more in the same vein – weigh them up, and come to an overall judgement. Debates about whether Genghis Khan, Tamerlaine, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, or someone else was the greatest criminal of all time are merely perverse; they make no scholarly or human sense. In this respect, the memory of humanity should have room not just for one mass murder but for several, each of which is unique in its own way. They can take their place in this memory as equals, without any hierarchy of evaluation.
Translated from German by Gerard Holden, Frankfurt
· Egbert Jahn (1941), Dr. phil., professor for political sciences and contemporary history, University of Mannheim
[i] This contribution takes up issues addressed in an earlier article and develops them further with reference to the Holodomor. The earlier article was “Zur Phänomenologie der Massenvernichtung. Kolyma, Auschwitz, Hiroshima und der potentielle nukleare Holocaust,” Leviathan, 1, 1990, pp. 7–38. A shorter Ukrainian version of this earlier article appeared in Suchasnist’, 11, 1992, pp. 44–56, and a Russian version in Egbert Jan, Issledovaniya problem mira v period i posle konflikta “Vostok-Zapad” (Münster, Moscow 1997), pp. 203–255.
[ii] It seems that nobody has yet attempted to test this hypothesis, which is not much more than a historical impression, in any systematic way. The methodological difficulties appear to be insuperable, and the data needed are not available. Nor have the attempts that have been made to provide statistical estimates of at least the victims of wars in different centuries gone very far. Quincy Wright made one such attempt in his great book A Study of War (Chicago, 1965), pp. 218–248.
[iii] It is often mistakenly assumed that “kulak” is a social term referring to relatively prosperous peasants. In fact, it is a denunciatory swearword that originally had antisemitic connotations, see Andrzej J. Kaminski, Konzentrationslager 1896 bis heute. Eine Analyse (Stuttgart 1982), p. 123.
[iv] The word “holocaust” was first used by Elie Wiesel in the 1960s and entered many languages as a result of the 1978 American TV series that used the word as its title.
[v] Very different figures continue to be given, ranging from 3 million to over 11 million. In the special issue published by Osteuropa on the subject (Osteuropa 12, 2004), Rudolf A. Mark and Gerhard Simon give the figure of 5-8 million (p. 10), and according to Nikolaus Katzer the number of deaths was between 7.2 and 11.25 million (p. 100).
[vi] Vasyl Hrysko, Ukrains’kyi “holokost” 1933 (New York, Toronto 1978). The word “holocaust” was used in the German translation of Robert Conquest’s book The Harvest of Sorrow, but it did not appear in the original title: The Harvest of Sorrow: Collectivization and the Terror-Famine, 1986, translated as Ernte des Todes. Stalins Holocaust in der Ukraine 1929–1933 (München 1988).
[vii] In Severnaya kommuna, 19 November 1918, quoted in Conquest, Ernte, p. 34.
[viii] For more on this point see Egbert Jahn, “Zum Widerspruch zwischen dem allgemeinen Interventionsverbot und einem Interventionsgebot bei Völkermord”, in Mathias Albert, Bernhard Moltmann and Bruno Schoch (eds.), Die Entgrenzung der Politik. Internationale Beziehungen und Friedensforschung. Festschrift für Lothar Brock zum 65. Geburtstag (Frankfurt, New York 2004), pp. 65–94.
[ix] Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr distinguished between politicide and genocide in an article published in 1988: “In genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics, i.e., ethnicity, religion, or nationality. In politicides the victim groups are defined primarily in terms of their hierarchical position or political opposition to the regime and dominant groups.” Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr, “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945”, International Studies Quarterly 3, 1988, p. 360.
[x] Ernst Nolte, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 July 1986, also in “Historikerstreit”. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung (München 1987), pp. 39-48, quotation from p. 45.
[xi] Hans Ulrich Wehler mistakenly suggests that there is a difference between “civilized” and “uncivilized” countries in his book Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zum „Historikerstreit“ (München 1988), p. 167ff.
[xii] Rudolph J. Rummel, The Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 (Münster 1998).
[xiii] Osteuropa, 12, 2004, see the contributions by Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi, Wilfried Jilge, and Valerii Vasil’ev.
[xiv] Klaus Jürgen Gantzel and Torsten Schwinghammer (eds.), Die Kriege nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 bis 1992 (Münster 1995), p. 10.
[xv] Osteuropa 12, 2004.
[xvi] On this point, see Yurii Shapoval in Osteuropa, 12, 2004.
[xvii] As is done, for example, by Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi in his contribution to Osteuropa, 12, 2004.
[xviii] On this point, see Nikolaus Katzer’s contribution to Osteuropa 12, 2004.
[xix] See the calculations by Rummel, The Statistics of Democide.
Full text file (PDF, 1.640 kB)